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Abstract—Advance in deep learning algorithms overshadows
their security risk in software implementations. This paper dis-
closes a set of vulnerabilities in popular deep learning frameworks
including Caffe, TensorFlow, and Torch. Contrast to the small
code size of deep learning models, these deep learning frameworks
are complex and contain heavy dependencies on numerous open
source packages. This paper considers the risks caused by these
vulnerabilities by studying their impact on common deep learning
applications such as voice recognition and image classifications.
By exploiting these framework implementations, attackers can
launch denial-of-service attacks that crash or hang a deep
learning application, or control-flow hijacking attacks that cause
either system compromise or recognition evasions. The goal of
this paper is to draw attention on the software implementations
and call for the community effort to improve the security of deep
learning frameworks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence becomes an attention focus in recent
years partially due to the success of deep learning applications.
Advances in GPUs and deep learning algorithms along with
large datasets allow deep learning algorithms to address real-
world problems in many areas, from image classification
to health care prediction, and from auto game playing to
reverse engineering. Many scientific and engineering fields are
passionately embracing deep learning.
These passionate adoptions of new machine learning algo-
rithms has sparked the development of multiple deep learning
frameworks, such as Caffe [3], TensorFlow [1], and Torch [6].
These frameworks enable fast development of deep learning
applications. A framework provides common building blocks
for layers of a neural network. By using these frameworks,
developers can focus on model design and application specific
logic without worrying the coding details of input parsing,
matrix multiplication, or GPU optimizations.
In this paper, we examine the implementation of three
popular deep learning frameworks: Caffe, TensorFlow, and
Torch. And we collected their software dependencies based on
the sample applications released along with the framework.
The implementation of these frameworks are complex (often
with hundreds of thousands lines of code) and are often built
over numerous 3rd party software packages, such as image and
video processing, scientific computation libraries.
A common challenge for the software industry is that
implementation complexity often leads to software vulnera-
bilities. Deep learning frameworks face the same challenge.
Through our examination, we found multiple dozens of im-
plementation flaws. Among them, 15 ones have been assigned
with CVE numbers. The types of flaws cover multiple common
types of software bugs, such as heap overflow, integer overflow,
use-after-free.
We made a preliminary study on the threats and risks
caused by these vulnerabilities. With a wide variety of deep
learning applications being built over these frameworks, we
consider a range of attack surfaces including malformed data
in application inputs, training data, and models. The potential
consequences from these vulnerabilities include denial-of-
service attack, evasion to classifications, and even to system
compromise. This paper provides a brief summary of these
vulnerabilities and the potential risks that we anticipate for
deep learning applications built over these frameworks.
Through our preliminary study of three deep learning
frameworks, we make the following contributions:
• This paper exposes the dependency complexity of popular
deep learning frameworks.
• This paper presents a preliminary study of the attack
surface for deep learning applications.
• Through this paper, we show that multiple vulnerabilities
exist in the implementation of these frameworks.
• We also study the impact of these vulnerabilities and
describe the potential security risks to applications built
on these vulnerable frameworks.
II. LAYERED IMPLEMENTATION OF DEEP LEARNING
APPLICATIONS
Deep learning frameworks enable fast development of ma-
chine learning applications. Equipped with pre-implemented
neural network layers, deep learning frameworks allow devel-
opers to focus on application logic. Developers can design,
build, and train scenario specific models on a deep learning
framework without worrying about the coding details of input
parsing, matrix multiplication, or GPU optimizations.
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Fig. 1: The Layered Approach for Deep Learning Applications.
The exact implementation of deep learning applications
varies, but those built on deep learning frameworks are usually
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consisted of software in three layers. Figure 1 shows the
layers of typical deep learning applications. The top layer
contains the application logic, the deep learning model and
corresponding data resulted from the training stage. These are
components usually visible to the developers. The middle layer
is the implementation of the deep learning frameworks, such as
tensor components and various filters. The interface between
the top two layers are usually specified in the programming
language used to implement the middle layer. For examples,
the choices of programming language interfaces include C++,
Python, and Lua for Caffe, TensorFlow, and Torch respectively.
The bottom layers are building blocks used by the frameworks.
These build blocks are components to accomplish tasks such
as video and audio processing and model representations (e.g.
protobuf). The selection of building blocks varies depending on
the design of a framework. For example, TensorFlow contains
its own implementations of video and image processing built
over 3rd party packages such as librosa and numpy, whereas
Caffe chooses to directly use open source libraries, such as
OpenCV and Libjasper, to parse media inputs. Even the bottom
and the middle layers are often invisible to the developers of
the deep learning applications, these components are essential
part of deep learning applications.
Table I provides some basic statistics of the implementa-
tions of deep learning frameworks. In our study, the versions
of TensorFlow and Caffe that we analyzed are 1.2.1 and 1.0.
The study also include Torch7. As the default Torch package
only support limited image formats, we choose to study the
version of Torch7 that combines OpenCV [9] that support
various image formats such as bmp, gif, and tiff.
We measure the complexity of a deep learning framework
by two metrics, the lines of code and the number of software
dependency packages. We count the lines of code by using
the cloc tool on Linux. As described in table I, all these
implementation’s code bases are not small. Tensorflow has
more 887 thousands lines of code, Torch has more than 590K
lines of code, and Caffe has more than 127K. In addition, they
all depends on numerous 3rd party packages. Caffe is based
on more than 130 depending libraries (measured by the Linux
ldd utility), and Tensorflow and Torch depend on 97 Python
modules and 48 Lua modules respectively, which was counted
by the import or require modules.
TABLE I: DL frameworks and Their Dependencies
DL
Framework
lines of code number of
dep. package
sample packages
Tensorflow 887K+ 97 librosa,numpy
Caffe 127K+ 137 libprotobuf,libz,opencv
Torch 590K+ 48 xlua,qtsvg,opencv
Layered approach is a common practice for software
engineering. Layering does not introduce flaws directly, but
complexity in general increases the risks of vulnerabilities.
Any flaw in the framework or its building components affects
applications building on it. The next section of this paper
presents some preliminary findings of flaws in implementa-
tions.
III. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
While there are numerous discussion about deep learning
and artificial intelligence applications, the security of these
applications draws less attention. To illustrate the risks and
threats related to deep learning applications, we first present
the attack surfaces of machine learning applications and then
consider the type of risks resulted from implementation vul-
nerabilities.
A. Attack Surfaces
Without losing generality, here we use MNIST handwriting
digits [11] recognition as an example to consider the attack
surface of deep learning applications. We believe an image
recognition application like MNIST can be exploited from the
following three angles:
• Attack Surface 1 – Malformed Input Image: Many current
deep learning applications, once being trained, usually
work on input data for classification and recognition pur-
poses. For an application that read inputs from files or the
network, attackers potentially can construct malformed
input. This applies to the MNIST image recognition
application, which read inputs from files. The attack
surface is significantly reduced for applications that take
input from a sensor such as a directed connected camera.
But the risk of malformed input is not eliminated in those
cases, and we will discuss it in the next section.
• Attack Surface 2 – Malformed Training Data: Image
recognition applications take training samples, which can
be polluted or mislabeled if training data come from
external sources. This is often known as data poisoning
attack.
Data poisoning attack does not need to rely on software
vulnerabilities. However, flaws in implementations can
make data poisoning easier (or at least harder to be
detected). For example, we have observed inconsistency
of the image parsing procedure in the framework and
common desktop applications (such as image viewer).
This inconsistency can enable a sneaky data pollution
without being noticed by people managing the training
process.
• Attack Surface 3 – Malformed Models: Deep learning
applications can also be attacked if the developers use
models developed by others. Although many developers
design and build models from scratch, many models
are made available for developers with less sophisticated
machine learning knowledge to use. In such case, these
models becomes potential sources that can be manip-
ulated by attackers. Similar to data poisoning attacks,
attackers can threat those applications carrying external
models without exploiting any vulnerabilities. However,
implementation flaws, such as a vulnerability in the model
parsing code help attackers to hide malformed models and
make the threat more realistic.
Certainly, the attack surface varies based on each specific
application, but we believe these three attack surfaces cover
most of the space from where attackers threat deep learning
applications.
B. Type of Threats
We have studied several deep learning frameworks and
found a dozen of implementation flaws. Table II summarizes a
portion of these flaws that have been assigned with CVE num-
bers. These implementation flaws make applications vulnerable
to a wide range of threats. Due to the space limitation, here
we only present the threats caused by malformed input, and
we assume the applications take input from files or networks.
TABLE II: CVEs Found for DL frameworks and Dependencies
DL Framework dep. packages CVE-ID Potential Threats
Tensorflow numpy CVE-2017-12852 DOS
Tensorflow wave.py CVE-2017-14144 DOS
Caffe libjasper CVE-2017-9782 heap overflow
Caffe openEXR CVE-2017-12596 crash
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12597 heap overflow
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12598 crash
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12599 crash
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12600 DOS
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12601 crash
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12602 DOS
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12603 crash
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12604 crash
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12605 crash
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-12606 crash
Caffe/Torch opencv CVE-2017-14136 integer overflow
• Threat 1 – DoS attacks : The most common vulnerabilities
that we found in deep learning frameworks are software
bugs that cause programs to crash, or enter an infinite
loop, or exhaust all of memory. The direct threat caused
by such bugs are denial-of-service attacks to applications
running on top of the framework. The list below shows
the patch to a bug found in the numpy python package,
which is a building block for the TensorFlow framework.
The numpy package is used for matrix multiplication and
related processing. It is commonly used by applications
built over TensorFlow. The particular bug occurs in the
pad() function, which contains a while loop that would not
terminate for inputs not anticipated by the developers. The
flaws occur because of the variable safe-pad in the loop
condition is set to a negative value when an empty vector
is passed from a caller. Because of this bug, we showed
that popular sample TensoFlow applications, such as the
Urban Sound Classification [7], will hang with special
crafted sound files.
Listing 1: numpy patch example
--- a/numpy/lib/arraypad.py
+++ b/numpy/lib/arraypad.py
@@ -1406,7 +1406,10 @@ def pad(array, pad_width, mode, **kwargs):
newmat = _append_min(newmat, pad_after, chunk_after, axis)
elif mode == ’reflect’:
- for axis, (pad_before, pad_after) in enumerate(pad_width):
+ if narray.size == 0:
+ raise ValueError("There aren’t any elements to reflect in ’array’!")
+
+ for axis, (pad_before, pad_after) in enumerate(pad_width):
... ...
method = kwargs[’reflect_type’]
safe_pad = newmat.shape[axis] - 1
while ((pad_before > safe_pad) or (pad_after > safe_pad)):
... ...
• Threat 2 – Evasion attacks: Evasion attacks occur when
an attacker can construct inputs that should be classified
as one category but being misclassified by deep learning
applications as a different category. Machine learning
researchers have spent a considerable amount of research
effort on generating evasion input through adversarial
learning methods [5, 10]. When faced with vulnerable
deep learning framework, attackers can instead achieve
the goal of evasion by exploiting software bugs. We
found multiple memory corruption bugs in deep learn-
ing frameworks that can potentially cause applications
to generate wrong classification outputs. Attackers can
achieve evasion by exploiting these bugs in two way: 1)
overwriting classification results through vulnerabilities
that given attackers ability to modify specific memory
content, 2) hijacking the application control flow to skip
or reorder model execution.
The list below shows an out-of-bounds write vulnerability
and the corresponding patch. The data pointer could be
set to any value in the readData function, and then a
specified data could be written to the address pointed by
data. So it can potentially overwrite classification results.
Listing 2: OpenCV patch example
bool BmpDecoder::readData( Mat& img )
{
uchar* data = img.ptr();
....
if( m_origin &=& IPL_ORIGIN_BL )
{
data += (m_height - 1)*(size_t)step; // result an out bound write
step = -step;
}
....
if( color )
WRITE_PIX( data, clr[t] );
else
*data = gray_clr[t];
....
}
index 3b23662..5ee4ca3 100644
--- a/modules/imgcodecs/src/loadsave.cpp
+++ b/modules/imgcodecs/src/loadsave.cpp
+
+static Size validateInputImageSize(const Size& size)
+{
+ CV_Assert(size.width > 0);
+ CV_Assert(size.width <= CV_IO_MAX_IMAGE_WIDTH);
+ CV_Assert(size.height > 0);
+ CV_Assert(size.height <= CV_IO_MAX_IMAGE_HEIGHT);
+ uint64 pixels = (uint64)size.width * (uint64)size.height;
+ CV_Assert(pixels <= CV_IO_MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS);
+ return size;
+}
@@ -408,14 +426,26 @@ imread_( const String& filename, int flags, int hdrtype, Mat* mat=0 )
// established the required input image size
- CvSize size;
- size.width = decoder->width();
- size.height = decoder->height();
+ Size size = validateInputImageSize(Size(decoder->width(), decoder->height()));
• Threat 3 – System Compromise: For software bugs that
allows an attacker to hijack control flow, attackers can
potentially leverage the software bug and remotely com-
promise the system that hosts deep learning applications.
This occurs when deep learning applications run as a
cloud service to input feed from the network.
The list below shows a patch to a simple buffer overflow
found in the OpenCV library. The OpenCV library is
a computer vision library which designed for computa-
tional efficiency and with a strong focus on real-time
applications. OpenCV supports the deep learning frame-
works, such as TensorFlow, Torch/PyTorch and Caffe.
The buffer overflow occurs in the readHeader function
in grfmt_bmp.cpp. The variable m_palatte represents a
buffer whose size is 256*4 bytes, however, the value
of clrused is from an input image which can be set to
an arbitrary value by attackers. Therefore, a malformed
BMP image could result to buffer overflow from the get-
Bytes() call. Through our investigation, this vulnerability
provides the ability to make arbitrary memory writes and
we have successfully forced sample programs (such as
cpp_classification [2] in Caffe) spawning a remote shell
based on our crafted image input.
While doing this work, we found another group of re-
searchers [8] that have also studied the vulnerabilities
and impact of OpenCV on machine learning applications.
Although their idea of exploring OpenCV for system
compromise shares a similar goal with our effort, they
did not find or release vulnerabilities that are confirmed
by OpenCV developers [4]. In contrast, our findings have
been confirmed by corresponding developers and many
of them have been patched based on our suggestion.
In addition, we have also developed proof-of-concept
exploitation that has successfully demonstrated remote
system compromise (by remotely gaining a shell) through
the vulnerabilities found by us.
Listing 3: OpenCV patch example
index 86cacd3..257f97c 100644
--- a/modules/imgcodecs/src/grfmt_bmp.cpp
+++ b/modules/imgcodecs/src/grfmt_bmp.cpp
@@ -118,8 +118,9 @@ bool BmpDecoder::readHeader()
if( m_bpp <= 8 )
{
- memset( m_palette, 0, sizeof(m_palette));
- m_strm.getBytes( m_palette, (clrused == 0? 1<<m_bpp : clrused)*4 );
+ CV_Assert(clrused < 256);
+ memset(m_palette, 0, sizeof(m_palette));
+ m_strm.getBytes(m_palette, (clrused == 0? 1<<m_bpp : clrused)*4 );
iscolor = IsColorPalette( m_palette, m_bpp );
}
else if( m_bpp == 16 && m_rle_code == BMP_BITFIELDS )
IV. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The previous section presents software vulnerabilities in
the implementations of deep learning frameworks. These vul-
nerabilities are only a set of factors that affect the overall ap-
plication security. There are multiple other factors to consider,
such as where does an application take input from, whether
training data are well formatted, that also affect the security
risks. We briefly discussed a few related issues here.
A. Security Risks for Applications in Closed Environments
Many sample deep learning applications are designed to
be used in a closed environment, in which the application
acquires input directly from sensors closely coupled with the
application. For example, the machine learning implementation
running on a camera only takes data output from the built-in
camera sensor. Arguably the risk of malformed input is lower
than an application takes input from network or files controlled
by users. However, a closely coupled sensor does not eliminate
threats of malformed input. For example, there are risks
associated with sensor integrity, which can be compromised.
If the sensor communicates with a cloud server where the
deep learning applications run, attackers could reverse the
communication protocol and directly attack the backend.
B. Detect Vulnerabilities in Deep Learning Applications
We applied traditional bug finding methods, especially
fuzzing, to find the software vulnerabilities presented in this
paper. We expect all conventional static and dynamic analysis
methods apply to the deep learning framework implementation.
However, we found that coverage-based fuzzing tools are not
ideal for testing deep learning applications, especially for
discovering errors in the execution of models. Taking the
MNIST image classifier as an example, almost all images cover
the same execution path because all inputs go through the same
layers of calculation. Therefore, simple errors such as divide-
by-zero would not be easily found by coverage-based fuzzers
since the path coverage feedback is less effective in this case.
C. Security Risks due to Logical Errors or Data Manipulation
Our preliminary work focused on the “conventional” soft-
ware vulnerabilities that lead to program crash, control flow
hijacking or denial-of-service. It is interesting to consider if
there are types of bugs specific to deep learning and need
special detection methods. Evasion attack or data poisoning
attack do not have to relies on conventional software flaws such
as buffer overflow. It is enough to create an evasion if there are
mistakes allowing training or classification to use more data
than what an application suppose to have. The mismatch of
data consumption can be caused by a small inconsistency in
data parsing between the framework implementation and the
conventional desktop software.
One additional challenge for detecting logical errors in
deep learning applications is the difficulty to differentiate
insufficient training from intended manipulation, which targets
to have a particular group of inputs misclassified. We plan to
investigate methods to detect such type of errors.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this work is to raise awareness of the
security threats caused by software implementation mistakes.
Deep Learning Frameworks are complex software and thus
it is almost unavoidable for them to contain implementation
bugs. This paper presents an overview of the implementation
vulnerabilities and the corresponding risks in popular deep
learning frameworks. We discovered multiple vulnerabilities
in popular deep learning frameworks and libraries they use.
The types of potential risks include denial-of-service, evasion
of detection, and system compromise. Although closed appli-
cations are less risky in terms of their control of the input,
they are not completely immune to these attacks. Considering
the opaque nature of deep learning applications which buries
the implicit logic in its training data, the security risks caused
by implementation flaws can be difficult to detect. We hope
our preliminary results in this paper can remind researchers to
not forget conventional threats and actively look for ways to
detect flaws in the software implementations of deep learning
applications.
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